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Abstract. The contrast between real and fictional characters in our thinking needs 
further elaboration. In this commentary on Eco’s look at the ontology of the 
semiotic object, I suggest that human semiotic construction entails constant 
modulation of the relationship between the states of the real and fictional 
characters in irreversible time. Literary characters are examples of crystallized 
fictions which function as semiotic anchors in the fluid construction — by the 
readers — of their understandings of the world. Literary characters are thus 
fictions that are real in their functions — while the actual reality of meaning-
making consists of ever new fictions of fluid (transitory) nature. Eco’s ontological 
look at the contrast of the semiotic object with perceptual objects (Gegenstände) in 
Alexius Meinong’s theorizing needs to be complemented by the semiotic subject. 
Cultural mythologies of human societies set the stage for such invention and 
maintenance of such dynamic unity of fictionally real and realistically fictional 
characters.  
 
 
The army was going into battle. The soldiers — half of them with 
automatic rifles in their hands — with their bodies naked from the 
waists up — took up positions and 
 
                                                 
1   Commentary on Umberto Eco’s article On the ontology of fictional characters: 
A semiotic approach in the present issue. 
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[…] began to sing pious songs for 10, 15, or 20 minutes. Then the time-
keeper blew a whistle. On this sign, the troops began marching forward 
in a long line, shouting on the top of their voices: ‘James Bond! James 
Bond! James Bond!2 [...] The stone commanders led them and the line 
commanders ensured that the front line was maintained. Each stone 
commander carried a stone wrapped in cloth, which he threw at the 
enemy, at each time calling to each company and leading spirit, ‘Ching 
Poh, Franko, or Wrong Element, take up your position, command your 
people!’ This stone marked the limit past which the enemy bullets could 
not penetrate, thus creating a protective zone. The Holy Spirit soldiers 
were briefed not to cross this limit. Only when the stone grenade 
commanders had thrown their stones even further could the Holy Spirit 
troops advance again. Behind the stone commanders came the control-
lers, who sprinkled holy water and prayed. Each controller carried about 
five litres of holy water in a vessel with a small cup. The holy water was 
supposed to confuse the foe and stop him hitting his targets. Not until 
the stone commander gave the order did the Holy Spirit soldiers begin 
delivering the number of shots ordered by Lakwena. If the time-keeper 
blew his whistle again, the soldiers slowly retreated in the manner 
planned beforehand. (Behrend 1999: 59–60) 
 
This obviously bizarre scene of an army moving into a battle is a scene 
from Uganda sometime in 1986–87 when Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit 
Armed Forces (HSAF) attempted to liberate the country from violence 
and corruption, marching to take over the control of the capital Kam-
pala. Yet the army in action was largely invisible and the use of stone 
grenades and holy water as weapons oddly out of touch — or so it 
seems to us — with the thundering realities of AK-47s fired indis-
criminately after the singing of hymns ended.  
The battle script as described above is closer to a religious pro-
cession than to a military tactic3. The latter was not needed for the real 
                                                 
2   The chief technician called himself James Bond. 
3   The HSAF campaign was framed by a religious belief system that prohibited 
killing living beings — humans or snakes. Deeply embedded in the conversion to 
Christianity in the form of a syncretic religious system it needed to find a solution 
to the problem — how to kill under the belief system of “do not kill!” The solution 
was to delegate all the uncertainties of the real living (and dying) to the fate 
control of the spirit soldiers. 
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soldiers whose fate was completely determined by their invisible spirit 
co-fighters. At the maximum of Alice Lakwena’s campaign HSAF had 
10,000 real fighters, together with 140,000 others — the spirits who 
were involved in the fight.  The spirit fighters — fictions as determi-
nate for the HSAF soldiers as Anna Karenina is in the hands of rea-
ders — explain it all: both the win and the loss, the killing of the 
enemy and getting killed oneself. The pervasiveness of such expla-
nations parallels the omniscopous4 use of language in fortune telling 
(Aphek, Tobin 1990). Fictional characters have real consequences for 
human living and dying on the battlefields — not just for the queries 
of the minds of the readers of sophisticated novels. They can be 
created on the spot — when needed — and maintained (or aban-
doned) if needed further, or not. 
Or maybe the heroic realities of battlefields are such as they are 
made up to be theatrical fictions — united into scenes that are played 
out in reality (Turner 1982). After all, the history of warfare gives us 
many examples of ritualizing the military encounters: from colorful 
uniforms of the fighting armies of the past, to the conventions of how 
prisoners of war and civilians are to be treated in a military conflict. 
Even local conflicts — duels or their contemporary transformations in 
the form of court battles — are frameworks that rely on fictions as 
their anchor points. Such fictions, however, are situated within the 
existing social order, the hierarchical set-up of power relations that 
may be countered by local social conduct patterns. These patterns are 
built upon hyper-generalized value signs (e.g. “honor”, “justice”, “lo-
yalty”): 
 
The duel was characteristic of a socially strategic type of behavior which 
[…] hemmed around with formalized ritual […] even though it 
breached the central ruler’s and the state’s monopoly of violence. It 
raised above the masses those who belonged to certain social strata; in 
the first place the nobles and the officer corps, and then the fighting 
                                                 
4   Omniscopus= all-viewing. When the fortune-teller tells the client “you will 
have difficulties but you will overcome these” all possible scenarios for the future 
are covered. 
Jaan Valsiner 102
fraternities and their middle-class students and their Old Boys — in 
short, the stratum of those entitled to demand satisfaction. Through it, 
they submitted to the constraint of a special norm which made the 
formalized use of violence, possibly with lethal consequences, a duty for 
individual people under certain circumstances. (Elias 1996: 65; added 
emphasis) 
 
Socially normative situations such as duels, public executions or 
Shariah stoning of the norm-breakers, etc. are all constructed social 
dramas that create the illusion of reality to the otherwise un-real 
objects. Social power holders set the stage for the legitimate and 
illegitimate violence and thus the killing of people or animals becomes 
a semiotic object. In other terms — the making of the semiotic object 
is based on the construction of non-existing objects through social 
actions. 
 
 
 The reality of non-existing objects 
 
Eco (2009) relies upon the philosophical and psychological heritage of 
the “Graz School” of Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) in his construc-
tion of the semiotic object. The relevant contributions of Meinong and 
his students have been blissfully forgotten in psychology of our times 
but retained in philosophy (Albertazzi et al. 2001) — especially after 
the recognition that Meinong’s ideas have had substantive role to play 
in Bertrand Russell’s philosophy of mathematics. The “Graz tradition” 
was unique in the history of psychology and philosophy in Europe by 
its focus on the contrast between existing and non-existing objects 
(Bozzi 1996; Findlay 1963; Mally 1904; Meinong 1899; Modenato 
1996; for an overview see Rollinger 2008). All mathematical objects are 
non-existing objects. There are no geometric forms like triangle or 
square in the real life, even as there are myriads of triangular and 
quadratic objects that are real and from which these geometric notions 
could be abstracted. At the same time there are objects we can talk 
about — “a round triangle” — which cannot be imagined as existent. 
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Yet as we can talk about such objects they are imaginable, even with 
the result of finding them to be impossible.  
While the “Graz tradition” was focused on the ontology of the non-
existing objects, it failed to set these objects into a scheme that looked 
at their transformation. As he was pondering on the notion of “a 
golden mountain”, Meinong did not address the issue of under what 
circumstances would such non-existing object — or any other of their 
kinds — emerge in the meaning-making processes of their inventors. 
This is also not crucial for Eco who uses the examples of already fixed 
literary characters — Anna Karenina or Sherlock Holmes — rather 
than covers the torturous process of the life of the writer who is 
creating such characters. While both Meinong and Eco show the com-
plexity of the being of objects — non-existing and semiotic — they 
prefer to overlook the question of the becoming of these objects. 
 
 
From non-existing objects to semiotic objects  
 
Non-existing objects can exist as the result of semiosis. Meinong’s 
conceptualization of non-existing objects is of direct relevance for 
Eco’s (2009: 83) creation of semiotic objects. Most of the creations of 
our minds (any abstraction) are non-existing objects. They are created 
by active agents, persons or social institutions, in their quest for some 
stability in the otherwise overwhelmingly dynamic world. They 
become real as they are made up as fictions: real as semiotic organizers 
of our living — and dying. 
The semiotic object is 
 
[…] every device by which an expression conveys a set of properties as 
its content […] all expressions which convey as their proper content 
whatever we are used to call the meaning of the signified of the 
expression: the idea of an animal, of a place, of a thing, of a feeling, of an 
action, of a natural law like universal gravitation, of a mathematical 
entity, et cetera.  (Eco 2009: 88–89) 
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These properties are interpreted by recipients — other expressions — 
and the series of interrelated interpretations are shared and collectively 
recorded. The interpretation process might begin from a perceived 
field — yet move quickly beyond it. Meinong’s example of the 
meaning of the blue sky (Meinong 1899: 238) is a good example of 
semiosis where the meaning constructed “gets loose” from the 
perceived object5 and moves to establish its own form as a semiotic 
object. The homogeneous field of the sky fills the experiencer’s visual 
field in full, and leads to construction of holistic meaning that — as 
the language term “the blue sky” (“Himmelsbläue”) itself — looks as if 
it is like a point, and yet signifies a field of no discernible boundaries. 
The unclouded blue sky has no limits6! 
Furthermore, even points are indefinite — as long as the time of 
their emergence is considered: 
 
A punctiform object in time has no parts […] If we rap the surface of a 
table with the point of a pencil, the ‘tap’ is perfectly perceptible and 
distinct against the background of the usual noises around us, but it is 
impossible to distinguish between the moment at which it starts and at 
which it ends: in the ‘tap’ the beginning and the end coincide. This very 
important property can be captured by a paradox: when the punctiform 
event happens it has already happened. (Bozzi 1996: 297)   
 
This paradox bears upon Eco’s blind spot — while emphasizing the 
fluctuations between the fictional and real characters, their ontology, 
he takes no interest in the processes by which these characters are 
created. Signs are not given but constructed means for communication. 
And Umberto Eco is himself the master of such construction as 
                                                 
5   Meinong (1899: 237) calls these Wahrnehmungsflüchtige Gegenstande — 
objects that, when being in front of the perceiver (Modenato 1996: 95) lead to 
apprehension that transcends the perceived object and creates a semiotic object in 
its place. 
6   More precisely, its limit is ever infinite — as the notion of the horizon is a 
boundary that always moves away together with the horizon-maker’s efforts to 
move towards it (Smith 1999) 
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writing fiction entails the creation of an analogue of a distorted mirror. 
When we observe ourselves in it, our feeling is a playful double, where 
 
[…] on the one hand, we enjoy the hallucinatory characteristics of the 
medium. We therefore decide (for the sake of playing) to accept that we 
have three eyes or an enormous stomach or very short legs, just as we 
accept a fairy tale. In reality, we give ourselves a sort of pragmatic 
holiday: we accept that the mirror, which usually tells the truth, is lying 
[…] The game is a complex one: on the one hand, I behave as if I were 
standing in front of a plane mirror telling the truth, and I find that it 
gives back an ‘unreal’ image (that which I am not). If I accept this image, 
I am helping, one could say, the mirror to lie. The pleasure that this 
game gives me is not of totally semiotic nature but of aesthetic nature. 
(Eco 1984: 217–218) 
 
It is clear from games like that — helping the mirror lie, or doing the 
same to politicians while reading daily newspapers or accepting tele-
vision images as if these were lies-that-are-real — there is no inter-
pretation of a semiotic object without the interpreter, that is, the semio-
tic subject. It is the active intentional person — the author in case of 
fiction, or the reader (or non-reader) of that fiction who are re-
constructing any messages. They even create an interpretation out of 
nothing — or almost so — as indicate psychologists’ uses of inkblots as 
projective techniques and fortune-tellers stories based on palm lines. 
In some ways, the whole world a person lives in is a distorted mir-
ror — and if it is not, the person positions oneself so that it seems to 
be. The reliance on cosmetics — from makeup to cosmetic surgery — 
indicates the need to change one’s own form when we have to face a 
plain mirror. 
 
 
Transforming semiotic objects:  
growth of generalization 
 
Semiotic objects are constructed by the meaning-maker who both 
expresses and interprets the meanings one lives with. Karl Bühler’s 
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Organon Model (Fig. 1) is here in action within Umberto Eco’s 
Umwelt. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Organon Model (Bühler 1990) modified to depict 
abstracting generalization of the message in the communication process 
(solid lines and components in quotation marks are the original com-
ponents in Bühler’s model) 
 
 
The uncertainty of the communicative messages (depicted by over-
lapping circle and triangle in the middle) leads to abstractive generali-
zation. The semiotic object — similarly to Meinong’s “escaping per-
ceptual object” (which becomes “homeless”) — moves in the third 
dimension, towards ever greater abstraction of generalized feelings 
(generalized and abstracted message in Figure 1). It is through such 
over-generalized meanings, once constructed, that make the difference 
between a reader who feels devastated by the undoubtable act of Anna 
Karenina’s demise, and a reader who would treat the event as yet one 
more tally in the frequency count of suicide cases in 19th century 
literature. So when Eco correctly focuses on the immutability of the 
fictional characters — 
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[…] unlike all the other semiotic objects, which are culturally subject to 
revisions, and perhaps only similar to mathematical entities, they will 
never change and will remain the actors of what they did once and 
forever — and it is because of the incorrigibility of their deeds that we 
can dare to say that it is true that they were or did this and that. (Eco 
2009: 93) 
 
— it is the semiotic subjects, the users of the fictional characters in 
their own lives, who change. They change as they are participant ob-
servers in the fixed lives of the fictional characters due to the authors’ 
subjecting the characters to public scrutiny. Any author has to per-
form the exhibitionist act by bringing the private encounters with the 
invented characters to the public domain. Some decide at times 
against it — authors burning their own just finished manuscripts are 
known in literature.  
But once the fictional characters survive the “going public” they 
become indispensable precisely as they cannot change. Eco points that 
out eloquently, 
 
The charm of the great tragedies comes from the fact that their heroes, 
instead of escaping an atrocious fate, fall into the abyss that they have 
dug with their own hands because they do not know what expects them — 
and we, who see clearly where they are blindly going, cannot stop them. 
(Eco 2009: [95]; added emphasis) 
 
Yet it is not the hands of the heroes themselves but their makers — 
writers, Hollywood film makers, etc — through which the characters 
are made to act so that they fall into the abyss and by it keep us, the 
spectators, vicariously thrilled. The author may be accused by a reader 
for letting a certain character die or act in an undesirable (to the 
reader) a way, to which the author’s easy defense is that the character 
did it by herself. For the author the characters that become fictional in 
the end (in the novel) may have reality of one’s imagination when the 
novel is being written. Once the novel is finished the characters are 
destined to become fixed. As Eco points out, “Fictional characters live 
in an incomplete, handicapped world” (Eco 2009: 96) 
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The reality of life, ending in death, sets the stage for such move into 
the handicapped world. The finishing of a novel for an author may be 
equivalent to the death — the imaginary real characters now become 
fixed in the finished text. Publication of a book is in a way the funeral 
ceremony for the characters for its author and a new life for the 
semiotic subjects. The myriad of interpretations of Hamlet would 
continue as long as our education systems include him in our worlds. 
The fate of characters in fiction is a process similar to what happens 
with real people after their death — they become fixed as ghosts, 
spirits, or forefathers of social upheavals. Napoleon existed as a real 
person until he died and ever since he has been a ghost moving 
through the European minds, used for various meaning-making 
purposes. A miscarried foetus who had no chance to become a person, 
may be seen as a real person with all “baby things” (Layne 2000). We 
all become fixed as fictional characters — like Anna Karenina. Ceme-
teries and memorials are a living testimony of such transformation 
that sometimes evokes real and reverberating social turmoils7.  
Yet the fixed characters of novels, in contrast to their readers, are 
not only “twice born” (in the mind of the author, and after delivery to 
public), they are also “twice dead”. First, they die for the author when 
the book is published. But the second death is more conspicuous — 
the fading away of the fixed fictional characters from our playgrounds 
of meaning-making sends them into the oblivion. Eco is in a good 
fortune being able to use the image of Anna Karenina — but would 
have had little success making his argument with the help of Du-
mov — Anna Karenina’s peer in the pantheon of fictional characters 
whom Chehov created as a doctor who tragically died saving the life of 
a child8. Dumov was widely impactful in the cultural communication a 
century ago, yet in our 21st century he has passed away. Anna Kare-
                                                 
7   Raudsepp, M., and Wagner, W. The essentially other — Representational pro-
cesses that divide groups. Paper at Workshop “Trust and Distrust in Inter-Group 
Conflict and Communication”, Napoli, June 2008. 
8   I am grateful to Ellina Polonskaya and Eleonora Magomedova for finding 
Dumov for me — a naïve psychologist — from among the many dead fictional 
characters in the Russian literature. 
Between fiction and reality: Transforming the semiotic object 109
nina, Raskolnikov, and Hamlet continue to be card-carrying members 
in this Club of the Glorified. 
The fictional characters still do not change even there — in their 
fixed worlds. They are destined to live and die in their immutable 
“handicapped worlds”. They are sacrificed from the beginning in that 
role — for the sake of the real people who always move towards the 
fictional roles, yet purposefully refuse to become fixed in these. The 
author moves on to write another novel, rather than reiterate the one 
just finished. It is only in the case of canonical texts relevant for reli-
gious systems where “the true faith” is followed by their constructors. 
In the social sciences we start treating the searches for understandings 
by famous thinkers, which were actually tentative efforts usually 
phrased in vague terms, as if these words are final and immutable. The 
disciples of such famous scientists — whom they turn into fictional 
characters by the fame they attribute to them — are the grave-diggers 
for the very ideas they revere and propagate as the “truths of the grand 
masters”. The authors made famous by their followers may become 
gloriously fictional characters in science, through fixing their ideas 
even in their real lifetimes. Some even enjoy it. 
 
 
The importance of moving through boundaries:  
the subject really matters 
 
Intentionality is being born through the tension between the semiotic 
subject and the semiotic object. This look at the role of semiosis gives a 
renewed impetus for the philosophical perspective of Franz Brentano 
who posited the central feature of intentionality to be inherently 
present in human action (Rollinger 2008). The communication 
between goal-oriented persons who re-construct the message (see 
Figure 1 above) leads to the hyper-generalization of the highest level of 
willful agency (“why do you want X?” — “Because I want X”). This is 
the result of constructing the semiotic object out of a real (“why do 
you want this ice cream?”) or of the non-existing (“why do you want 
to be famous?”) one.  
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Such semiotic construction of intentionality entails crossing boun-
daries that limit the object of desire from the growing intention for it. 
If any X a person wants were instantly available, the semiotic object X 
(or wanting X) could not emerge. Only if there is, at the moment, 
inaccessibility of X, would statements of wanting X be possible. The 
use of semiotic means — turned into symbolic resources (Zittoun 
2006) — includes fixed literary characters like Hamlet, Anna Karenina, 
and others. Their stories, similarly to other myths — serve as mutually 
shared focal points in relation to which the person’s intentions in the 
given setting are being re-conceptualized. “Am I like Raskolnikov?” or 
“I do not end up in the shoes of Anna Karenina” are symbolic tools 
used to regulate the relating to the social boundaries. Inventing 
prayers is another (Del Río; Alvaréz 2007). Thus, persons need fictive 
characters for the flexibility of one’s meaning-making. These charac-
ters become solid islands in one’s own personal world in relation to 
which they organize their own movement through the life. If by some 
miracle these characters were to become unfixed — Hamlet would be 
re-born and finds a solution to his doubts, and marries Ophelia, or 
Raskolnikov finishes his studies and becomes a respected professional 
(Eco 2009: 95) — their functional use for the readers would vanish. 
We do not really want this9. 
 
 
Conclusion: The fate of the living 
 
Umberto Eco is a fiction. Whereas it may well be true that there exists 
a human being carrying in his luggage some identity document 
specifying this name and linking it with a photo image that remotely 
matches the appearance of the person who gave a talk in the main hall 
of Tartu University on May 6th, 2009, and it may also be true that 
some other real person on the same day gave him a piece of paper 
                                                 
9   However, new forms of television that allow for wishful re-writing of the 
scripts of next series of the soap operas based on viewer consensus would be an 
interesting real-life experiment here.  
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specifying that now he is not just a person with a name but a new 
doctor honoris causa of that university — through all these meaning-
making moves we are creating fictions-in-the-real. Recurrent symbolic 
acts of marking time — birthday congratulations — are of similar kind. 
The day of our birth is a coincidence — but accentuating it by rituals 
at some intervals creates the fictional character of the person being 5, 
15, 50 or 150 years old — and guiding the person to “feel one’s age” 
(or deny it). The semiotic object is possible only through the collabo-
ration by the semiotic subject — the meaning-making organism. Um-
berto Eco’s eloquent fictions — about others and about himself — are 
a testimony to the restless eagerness of the inquisitive human minds 
who create beautiful and horrifying fictional worlds — and inhabit 
them. 
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Между фикцией и реальностью:  
трансформация семиотического объекта 
 
Противоречие между реальными и вымышленными героями в на-
шем восприятии нуждается в дальнейшей разработке. В моем ком-
ментарии к наблюдениям Эко над онтологией семиотического 
объекта я полагаю, что человеческое семиотическое толкование вле-
чет за собой постоянную модуляцию отношений между сферами 
реальных и вымышленных персонажей в необратимом времени. 
Примеры литературных персонажей являются теми кристаллизую-
щимися фикциями, которые функционируют для читателей как 
семиотический якорь в зыбкой конструкции их понимания мира. 
Литературные персонажи являются, таким образом, фикциями, ко-
торые реальны в их функциях, — в то время как фактическая реаль-
ность смыслообразования состоит из все новых и новых фикций 
текучей (изменчивой) природы. Онтологическое видение Эко  
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контраста между семиотическим объектом и перцептивными объек-
тами (Gegenstände) в рамках теории Алексиуса Мейнонга нуждается 
в привнесении семиотического субъекта. Культурные мифологии че-
ловеческих сообществ подготовили почву для таких изобретений и 
поддержали динамическое единство фиктивно реальных и реально 
вымышленных персонажей. 
 
 
Väljamõeldise ja reaalsuse vahel:  
semiootilise objekti muutumine 
 
Erinevus reaalsete ja väljamõeldud isikute vahel meie mõtlemises vajab 
täpsemat määratlust. Käesolevas kommentaaris Eco käsitlusele semioo-
tilise objekti ontoloogiast väidan, et inimmõtlemise semiootiline ehitus 
eeldab tegelaskuju reaalse ja väljamõeldud oleku vahelise suhte katkema-
tut muutumist pöördumatus ajas. Kirjanduslikud kangelased on näide 
kristalliseerunud väljamõeldistest, mis funktsioneerivad semiootiliste 
ankrutena maailmast arusaamise konstrueerimise voolavas protsessis 
(lugeja poolt). Kirjanduslikud kangelased on seega väljamõeldised, mis on 
oma funktsioonidelt reaalsed, samas kui tähendusloome tegelik reaalsus 
koosneb üha uutest voolava (ehk pidevalt muutuva) loomusega välja-
mõeldistest. Eco Alexius Meinongi teoorial põhinevat ontoloogilist aru-
saama semiootilise ja tajuobjekti (Gegenstände) erisusest tuleks täiendada 
semiootilise subjekti mõistega. Taolist väljamõeldist võimaldavad ning 
väljamõeldislikult reaalsete ja realistlikult väljamõeldud tegelaskujude dü-
naamilise ühtsuse säilitamise eest seisavad ühiskondade kultuurilised 
mütoloogiad. 
 
 
